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practice 119
created Mar 14th, 19:26 by Heartking001
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Philosophy of mind in the English speaking world has been dominated by
two main ambitions throughout most of the twentieth century to avoid causal
mysteries about the workings of the mind, and to meet scepticism about
other minds by providing a reasonable account of what we can know, or
justifiably infer, about the mental states of other people. So most work in this
field has been governed by two constraints, which we will call naturalism and
psychological knowledge. According to naturalism human beings are
complex biological organisms and as such are part of the natural order,
being subject to the same laws of nature as everything else in the world. If
we are going to stick to a naturalistic approach, then we cannot allow that
there is anything to the mind which needs to be accounted for by invoking
vital spirits, incorporeal souls, or anything else which cannot be integrated
with natural science. Amongst the thorniest questions for naturalism are
whether thoughts with representational content the so called intentional
states such as beliefs and desires, which have the distinctive characteristic
and whether experiences with phenomenal properties, are themselves
suitable for integration within the corpus of scientific knowledge.
Psychological knowledge has two aspects, depending upon whether our
knowledge is of other people or of ourselves. Different accounts of the
mental will yield different stories about how we can have knowledge of it, or
indeed whether we can have such knowledge at all. So a theory of mind
ought to fit in with a reasonable view of the extent and nature of
psychological knowledge. The details of the fit are a somewhat delicate
matter. But the constraint of psychological knowledge does apply some
pressure. Buck's first day on the Dyea beach was like a nightmare. Every
hour was filled with shock and surprise. He had been suddenly jerked from
the heart of civilization and flung into the heart of things primordial. No lazy,
sun kissed life was this, with nothing to do but loaf and be bored. Here was
neither peace, nor rest, nor a moment's safety. All was confusion and action,
and every moment life and limb were in peril. There was imperative need to
be constantly alert; for these dogs and men were not town dogs and men.
They were savages, all of them, who knew no law but the law of club and
fang. He had never seen dogs fight as these wolfish creatures fought, and
his first experience taught him an unforgetable lesson. It is true, it was a
vicarious experience, else he would not have lived to profit by it. Curly was
the victim
two main ambitions throughout most of the twentieth century to avoid causal
mysteries about the workings of the mind, and to meet scepticism about
other minds by providing a reasonable account of what we can know, or
justifiably infer, about the mental states of other people. So most work in this
field has been governed by two constraints, which we will call naturalism and
psychological knowledge. According to naturalism human beings are
complex biological organisms and as such are part of the natural order,
being subject to the same laws of nature as everything else in the world. If
we are going to stick to a naturalistic approach, then we cannot allow that
there is anything to the mind which needs to be accounted for by invoking
vital spirits, incorporeal souls, or anything else which cannot be integrated
with natural science. Amongst the thorniest questions for naturalism are
whether thoughts with representational content the so called intentional
states such as beliefs and desires, which have the distinctive characteristic
and whether experiences with phenomenal properties, are themselves
suitable for integration within the corpus of scientific knowledge.
Psychological knowledge has two aspects, depending upon whether our
knowledge is of other people or of ourselves. Different accounts of the
mental will yield different stories about how we can have knowledge of it, or
indeed whether we can have such knowledge at all. So a theory of mind
ought to fit in with a reasonable view of the extent and nature of
psychological knowledge. The details of the fit are a somewhat delicate
matter. But the constraint of psychological knowledge does apply some
pressure. Buck's first day on the Dyea beach was like a nightmare. Every
hour was filled with shock and surprise. He had been suddenly jerked from
the heart of civilization and flung into the heart of things primordial. No lazy,
sun kissed life was this, with nothing to do but loaf and be bored. Here was
neither peace, nor rest, nor a moment's safety. All was confusion and action,
and every moment life and limb were in peril. There was imperative need to
be constantly alert; for these dogs and men were not town dogs and men.
They were savages, all of them, who knew no law but the law of club and
fang. He had never seen dogs fight as these wolfish creatures fought, and
his first experience taught him an unforgetable lesson. It is true, it was a
vicarious experience, else he would not have lived to profit by it. Curly was
the victim
